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Abstract
We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public expendi-
ture. This joint treatment permits analyzing the interdependencies between
the two policies: one cannot be chosen independently of the other. Empirical
evidence reveals that partisan confrontation essentially falls on expenditure
policies rather than on income taxation. We examine the case in which the
expenditure policy (or the size of government) is chosen by majority voting
and income taxation is consistently adjusted. This adjustment consists of de-
signing the income tax schedule that, given the expenditure policy, achieves
consensus among the population. The model determines the consensus in-
come tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure and the size of
government. The main results are that inequality is negatively related to
the size of government and to the pro-rich bias in public expenditure, and
positively or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending on
substitutability between government supplied and market goods. These im-
plications are validated using OECD data.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the interdependence between the income redistribu-
tion and the composition of public expenditure. Much of Public Finance has
treated taxation and expenditure separately.2 The literature on income redis-
tribution through taxes and cash transfers treats net tax revenue as a given
target and [implicitly] disregards how this revenue is spent. Likewise, the
public expenditure literature deals with the allocation of the public budget
independently of taxation. This paper takes one step towards an integrated
analysis of public taxation and expenditure. This joint treatment permits
analyzing the interdependencies between the two policies: one cannot be cho-
sen independently of the other. Empirical evidence strongly suggests that,
among the two policies, partisan confrontation essentially focusses on public
spending and size of government. We examine the case in which the expen-
diture policy is chosen by majority voting. Given this choice, the income
tax schedule is designed so that it achieves consensus among the popula-
tion, thus avoiding an additional front of political confrontation. The model
determines the consensus income tax schedule, the composition of public ex-
penditure and the size of government. The main results are that inequality is
negatively related to the size of government and to the pro-rich bias in pub-
lic expenditure, and positively or negatively related to the marginal income
tax, depending on substitutability between government supplied and market
goods. These implications are validated using OECD data.
In a recent issue of The Telegraph (18/10/2007), in an article entitled
Time for a new consensus on tax", former advisor to the UK prime minister
Gordon Brown, Chris Wales, describes the politics of taxation with the fol-
lowing words: The UK tax system has evolved over many generations (...)
Yet in all this time, real opportunities for informed debate about taxation
choices have been limited. In principle, the people consent to a given level
of taxation at the time of the General Election. In practice, there is little
constructive debate even then about the level of taxation and even less about
the way in which it is levied. (...) The result is that [in the Parliament] there
is almost no examination of the design of the tax system as a whole. (...)
The search for fairness may ultimately be futile. But the search for a broad
consensus is certainly not."
The above view of taxes playing a minor role in political competition and
being a matter of consensus instead goes beyond mere anecdotal observa-
tion. A similar impression emerges from the data on policy preferences by
political parties of all democratic countries since 1945 collected by Budge et
2With the exception of public goods, to which we will soon turn.
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al (2001, 2006). This work consists of the mapping of the content of electoral
party manifestos of each country, party and in each election, into a list of
over one hundred key topics. The frequency with which the di¤erent topics
are raised allows one to quantify the importance attached to each issue and
hence provides a rich snapshot of the position of each party in each election
campaign. It is striking that income taxation" or income redistribution" is
not included as a distinct entry. This reveals that, in spite of its obvious po-
litical relevance in a few countries in recent elections, this topic has not been
su¢ ciently prominent to deserve a specic category.3 This is not to mean
that economic issues have been generally disregarded. Over the entire sam-
ple, economic issues occupy fty percent of the average" party manifesto.
In contrast, there are various categories of public expenditure that have an
entry of their own. This is the case of expenditures on environment, cul-
ture, social services, social security and health, and education. In all, these
lines of public spending represent one third of the economic topics addressed.
Clearly, parties appear to systematically choose the expenditure side as their
punch line".
Consistently with this evidence, Wagshal (2001) nds that the partisan
composition of governments has no explanatory power on tax reforms. This
nding coincides with the analysis of Cusack and Baramendi (2006) who
highlight the puzzle that the social-democratic countries governed by left-
wing parties tend to tax labour rather than capital, while the more liberal,
market-economy countries governed by conservative parties tax capital rela-
tively more.
Political science has provided two kinds of explanations for this lack of
strong partisan competition on taxation. One makes the point that political
parties do not see much room for alternative taxation policies, either because
all share a similar paradigm" or because of the role of veto players". The
second explanation argues that most of redistribution is performed through
public spending and not by means of taxes and that hence it is there where
we should look for party competition.
On the rst argument, Swank and Steinmo (2002), based on the study of
14 OECD countries, nd that for the empirical record of tax policy change,
(...) although statutory tax rates, brackets, and investment incentives have
been reduced almost everywhere, we nd a remarkable stability in the levels
and distribution of tax burdens." They impute the registered tax reforms to
3The entry that bears the closest relationship to income taxation is entry 503 Social
Justice, described as Concept of equality; need for fair treatment of all people; special
protection of underprivileged; need for fair distribution of resources; removal of class barri-
ers; end of discrimination such as racial or sexual discrimination." Clearly, its relationship
with income taxation is rather remote.
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a "change in paradigm" shared by all governments and not to party competi-
tion within countries. Adam and Bevan (2004) also underscore that, during
recent decades, a powerful consensus has developed [which] has included not
only the structure of taxes, but also the level of tax rates. This conventional
wisdom is probably pretty soundly based, and so to refuse to subscribe to it
would be imprudent as well as incurring disapproval from IFIs." (p.60).
The second explanation for the modest political competition over taxa-
tion stresses that most redistribution takes place via the benets provided
by the di¤erent types of public expenditure rather than directly through in-
come taxes. Consequently, one should expect partisan opposition to be far
more lively on the front of the public spending. In an inuential paper,
Przevorski (1999) makes the point that political struggles over spending lev-
els may partly be fought as struggles over tax structure (p. 43). This is so
because large parts of welfare spending do not come in the form of transfers
but rather as services and goods provided by the state, such as the provision
of health care, child care, education, and so on" (Cusack and Fuchs, 2002,
p. 17). This widespread view is also shared by Ganghof (2005) who insists
on that governments that wish to redistribute through budgetary policy do
so mostly on the spending and not the taxing side of the budget" (p. 2) and
by Howard (1997) and Ervik (2000) who discusses the relevance of the hid-
denwelfare provision.4 Indeed, data suggests that political confrontation is
substantially stronger on public spending. Bruninger (2005), using data on
19 OECD countries from 1971 to 1999, nds support for the general partisan
hypothesis to the e¤ect that actual preferences of parties over the structure
and size of public spending do matter for policy decisions. Tsebelis and
Chang (2004) also nd that signicant changes in government composition
between one year to the next lead to signicant changes in the composition of
the budget" (p.473).
In sum, the evidence shows very modest party competition on taxation
4For the UK 2004/2005 the average yearly non-contributory social cash and near-cash
benets were 40 percent of the benets in kind received from the public provision of
education and health (Jones 2006). Hansen and Weisbrod (1969) and Pechman (1970) de-
veloped a controversy in the period 1969-1971 at the Journal of Human Resources over the
distributional impact of higher education subsidies. More recently, Le Grand (1982) and
Evandrou et al. (1993) have also studied the distributional impact of the public spending.
Health and education is strongly redistributive. There are other lines in the public budget,
such as foreign service, culture or law-and-order, that accrue benets increasing with in-
come (or income taxes). In Adam Smiths words: "The rich, in particular, are necessarily
interested to support that order of things, which can alone secure them in the possession
of their own advantages. (. . . ) Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security
of property, is, in reality, instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or those
who have some property against those who have none at all.(Book V, Chap. 1, Part II)
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and signicant opposition on expenditure because most of e¤ective redistrib-
ution is done via public spending rather than directly through redistributive
taxes. Our paper explains this behavior as follows. E¤ectiveness in partisan
competition induces the choice of only few dimensions for political confronta-
tion. Because of the interlinkages between taxation and expenditure policies,
political parties focus on public spending as their punch line in the politi-
cal debate. Majority voting thus establishes the expenditure policy/size of
government. Given this choice, the political actors  political parties, civil
servants, parliamentary committees, lobbies, expert advisors... look for a
reshu­ ing of the distribution of the tax burden that minimizes controversy,
by balancing the benets and the burden experienced by the citizens at the
di¤erent levels of the income ladder. We show that such consensual reshuf-
ing of income taxation is always achievable, so that partisan competition
can focus on the public spending side only.
We model individual preferences to depend upon personal disposable in-
come5 and on the set of goods and services  both public and/or private
in nature that individuals obtain from the government and that are -
nanced with the net tax revenue. Therefore, income taxation reduces private
consumption, but nances the supply of the goods provided by the govern-
ment. Consequently, the individual valuation of alternative tax and expen-
diture policies depends upon the balance between private consumption and
the public supply of goods. As also stressed in the public goods literature,
an appropriate mix of tax and public supply of goods may be found to be
individually acceptable.6
The largest part of government expenditure consists of the supply of
goods and services such as general administration, education, health, law-
and-order, infrastructures, culture, or defence, which are in turn nanced by
the net revenue of taxation (net of the social transfers).
The structure of public spending depends upon two types of issues. The
rst type concerns the specication of the set of commodities supplied by the
government and those that are produced by the private sector. This includes
regulations on whether the government reserves monopoly of supply (also
5The redistributive task of the government has been the object of extensive studies
by Moene and Wallerstein (2001a), (2001b) and (2003) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004).
Their concern is the relationship between the pre-tax and disposable income inequality:
the progressivity of the income tax and the size of the cash and near-cash social transfers.
They do not address the public provision of goods and services.
6See Warr (1983), Bernheim(1986) and Bergstrom (1986) for the voluntary contribu-
tions to public goods. Taylor-Gooby (2007) makes the more general point that attitudes
towards income taxation are more sympathetic with people being more aware of the ben-
ets they obtain from public spending.
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that of close substitutes) or permits various degrees of concurrence through
the private market and determines both the composition public expenditure
and substitutability between public and private bundles. For instance, secu-
rity or mail services were the monopoly of the government until a few decades
ago. The stricter the monopoly of the state, and the larger the number of
commodities included, the smaller is the substitutability between the public
and private bundles of commodities. Therefore, cross-country variation in the
substitutability between the two bundles is largely imputable to government
policies rather than to variations in preferences.
The second aspect of expenditure policy refers to the quantities supplied
of each commodity. Di¤erent compositions of government spending can be
interpreted as di¤erent ways of distributing its benets over the income dis-
tribution. A pro-rich expenditure policy may have a positive e¤ect on those
who bear the heavier part of the tax burden: the rich can enjoy a signicant
fraction of their taxes return to them in the form of goods and services they
value most and this may make themmore amenable towards income taxation.
For the sake of tractability we have aggregated all these goods and services
into one single commodity whose valuation varies across individuals accord-
ingly with their income. This variation in the valuation wants to capture how
pro-rich or pro-poor the expenditure policy is. We take two extreme cases as
benchmarks. In the pro-rich case, the structure of government expenditure is
such that it simply gives back to each tax payer its tax contribution. In the
second  egalitarian case the government expenditure is designed to give
all individuals the same value. We allow for intermediate policies modeled as
convex linear combinations of these two extreme policies. The weight given
to the rst expenditure policy indicates the degree of pro-rich bias of the
intermediate policies.
We focus on the tax schedules that for a given public expenditure policy
have the property of achieving consensus. That is, given the distributive
bias of the expenditure policy, we are interested in the tax rate with a degree
of progressivity that is found acceptable by everyone. We show that there
is a unique tax schedule that satises this acceptability criterion and we
examine its properties. The income tax schedule is shown to depend on the
composition of the public expenditure and on the substitutability between the
goods and services supplied by the government and the consumption goods
privately obtained through the market. As for the choice of the distributive
bias in the expenditure policy, consensus is no longer possible. We show
that the redistributive bias chosen by majority voting is increasing in income
inequality [the relative gap between mean and median income].
One could argue that in some relevant countries (certainly in the US)
changes in income taxes occupy a signicant role in the political debate. As
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we shall show in Section 7, our analysis can be rewritten so that the political
debate and majoritarian voting is on the size of government. Then, because
of the inter-dependence between taxation and expenditure, given the size of
government, there is a unique distribution of the benets and of the burden
such that redistribution via income taxation and spending achieves consensus
among the actors (political parties, parliamentary committees, lobbies, and
civil servants).
What is the net value added of this shift of partisan competition from
taxes to public expenditure? Besides bringing the model closer to what
appears to be the actual political process, this shift yields three interesting
novel insights: (i) it brings into stage the interdependence between taxation
and distributive expenditure; (ii) it unveils the impact of public decisions
modifying the substitutability between publicly supplied goods and market
goods, and (iii) it explains why inequality has a non-monotonic relationship
with income tax progressivity.
Our analysis implies that the main determinants of redistribution are:
(a) the pro-rich bias in the composition of the public spending (the size of
government), and (b) the substitutability between the commodities privately
obtained through the market and the commodities publicly provided.7 The
degree of substitutability between the two types of commodities plays a cru-
cial role in determining the attitudes towards taxation. We then examine how
the changes in substitutability translate into the progressiveness of income
taxation.
For constant-elasticity preferences we obtain explicit, testable results. We
focus on three implications: (1) the bias in public spending is negatively re-
lated to inequality (the relative gap mean/median incomes); (2) the size of
government is negatively related to inequality; and (3) a negative relationship
between the marginal tax rate and inequality in countries with high substi-
tutability and a positive relationship in countries with low substitutability.
We empirically test these propositions with OECD country data. Due to
the poor availability of estimates for the substitutability between public and
private spending at the individual level and for the pro-rich bias in public
expenditure, we test our propositions with proxies of these entities. The em-
pirical support of the above propositions obtained using the proxies is highly
signicant.
To test the result of the relationship between the marginal tax rate and
inequality, we use threshold regressions and kernel regressions (the latter for
7The similarity with the lines of argument in the voluntary provision of public goods is
obvious. There individuals conceive the tax paid as the cost necessary to obtain a useful
commodity provided by the state.
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robustness, so as to not impose any functional form on the data). Threshold
regressions allow the researcher to identify exact values of the elasticity of
substitution at which the relationship under investigation (the marginal tax
rate and inequality) switches from positive to negative. Threshold regres-
sions conrm that for lower elasticities of substitution between public and
private goods, there is a positive relationship between marginal tax rates and
inequality, and for higher elasticities, there is a negative relationship.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we develop the
model. Section 3 denes the notion of consensus taxation, proves the exis-
tence and uniqueness of a consensual income tax and shows that this tax is
welfare e¢ cient. Section 4 discusses its properties. Section 5 is devoted to
the relationship between income tax progressiveness, the pro tax-payer bias
of public spending, and the degree of substitutability between the private
and public bundles of commodities. Section 6 proves that the expenditure
policy chosen by majority voting will be the one preferred by the median
voter and shows that the pro-rich bias is negatively related to inequality. In
Section 7 we show that for CES preferences the above results can equivalently
be expressed in terms of size of government" instead of expenditure bias".
Section 8 discusses the strategy of the empirical tests. Section 8.3 tests the
relationship between inequality and the bias in the expenditure policy and
Section 8.5 with the marginal income tax rate. Finally, section 9 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Individuals
Let us assume a continuum of individuals. Individual income is denoted by
y; it is assumed to be exogenous, and distributed over the population with
cdf F on support [a;1).
We shall denote the average per capita income by .
The set of commodities is divided into two bundles, private (denoted x)
and public (denoted g). Individual demand for the private commodities is
satised through the markets: in view of market prices individuals choose
how best to allocate their disposable income. The individual consumption
of the publicly supplied commodities is xed by the government through its
expenditure policy.
We assume all commodity prices are constant. This allows us to consider
the aggregate expenditure on the two bundles of commodities.
We assume that individual preferences are dened on private and public
goods only and are represented by u(x; g). Labour is thus assumed to be
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rigidly supplied.
On individual preferences we make the following standard assumptions:
Assumption 1 ux > 0; ug > 0; uxx < 0; ugg < 0 and uxg > 0: Further,
we assume that for g > 0; lim
x!0
ux = 1 and lim
x!1
ux = 0; and for x > 0;
lim
g!0
ug =1 and lim
g!1
ug = 0:
The elasticity of substitution between the two commodity bundles plays a
key role in our analysis. A higher consumption of the commodities supplied
by the government can be achieved only by accepting higher taxation. This is
equivalent to substituting private for publicly provided consumption goods.
How much individuals will be willing to give up on private consumption to
increase the level of the public bundle depends upon their substitutability.
Therefore, the individual attitudes towards taxation will be critically inu-
enced by the elasticity of substitution between the privately and publicly
supplied commodities.
2.2 Income Taxation
The government raises taxes/transfers in order to redistribute income across
individuals. The net public revenue after performing the redistribution of in-
comes is spent for the provision of the public commodity bundle. Individuals
spend their disposable income to purchase private commodities. To save on
notation we denote disposable income by x.
t(y) denotes the tax (if positive) or subsidy (if negative) allocated to each
individual with income y. Therefore,
x(y) = y   t(y): (1)
Note that disposable income will exceed pre-tax factor income when t(y) < 0.
t denotes the per capita aggregate net surplus/decit after income redis-
tribution, i.e.
t =
Z
t(y)dF (y): (2)
2.3 Public Expenditure
In this section, we analyse the e¤ect of redistribution on the size of govern-
ment : the share of the public supply of commodities over aggregate factor
income. Net tax revenue is endogenously determined together with the in-
come tax schedule.
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Analysing the structure of expenditure is important because it establishes
the distribution of its benets. Transferring resources from primary educa-
tion to the support of arts renders the benets of public spending to be
biased towards the rich. Therefore, the structure of the public expenditure
implicitly denes a distribution of the benets over the taxpayers. We rep-
resent the benet from public expenditure to an individual with income y as
equivalent to receiving g(y) worth of public expenditure.
The governments budget is balanced, and hence
g 
Z
g(y)dF (y) = t: (3)
The size of government", & is the weight of the goods and services pro-
vided by the government relative to GDP, that is,
& =
g

: (4)
To make the "public spending bias towards the rich" (hereafter, the "pro-
rich bias") concept operational, let us dene two benchmarks: the two ex-
treme cases of the distribution of benets from public expenditure. In the
rst case, public spending is fully biased towards the rich and returns the
exact amount of taxes paid as benets: g(y) = t(y). The second benchmark
case is the egalitarian expenditure policy: g(y) = g = t. The family of in-
termediate" expenditure policies are dened as convex linear combinations
of these two extreme benchmarks. That is, an expenditure policy with a
pro-rich bias  is dened as
g(y; g; ) = t(y) + (1  )g = t(y) + (1  )t; with  2 (0; 1): (5)
A budget balanced scal policy is thus fully characterized by  and the
tax function t(:). As we have argued earlier, the expenditure policy, , is
chosen by majority voting.8 In the next section we shall shall show that for
each such choice of  there is a unique tax function that is acceptable to each
tax payer and is welfare e¢ cient.
3 Consensus Income Taxation
In the Introduction we have reported on the evidence that partisan compe-
tition appears to be strong on expenditure policy and very mild on income
8In Section 7 we show that one can as well rewrite the model with voting over the size
of government &.
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taxation. We have argued that the joint treatment of taxation and expen-
diture allows one to highlight the fact that an increase in taxes will also
bring with it an increase in expenditure. Once the bias in public expenditure
has been chosen, all individuals can compare the loss (increase) in private
consumption due to higher taxes (subsidies) with the increase (loss) of the
benets from increased public spending. For some income levels the net out-
come will be positive and will be favorable to the increase in taxation and
for some it will have the opposite e¤ect. We assume that, given the voted
, the public administration is interested in reshu­ ing the income tax  the
distribution of the burden such that the opposition to the tax reform is
minimized so that no additional front of party confrontation is initiated.9 Is
there a tax function such that the benets of a marginal change just equal
the losses at each income level? As it turns out, for each expenditure policy
there is a unique tax function that no one objects and it is welfare e¢ cient.
It is for this reason we call this income tax consensual".
Surprisingly, the requirement of consensus is neither too stringent nor too
loose. For any given distribution of income there is always one and only one
tax function that satises this property.
3.1 Denition
A tax function t() is acceptable to an individual with income y if she does not
wish to vary its progressivity. A tax function is consensual if it is unanimously
acceptable.
Consider a particular t() with net tax revenue t, as dened in (2). In
order to operationalize the notion of variation of the progressivity" of t()
we focus on a¢ ne transformations ~t() such that
~t(y) = + t(y): (6)
with Z
~t(y)dF (y) =
Z
[+ t(y)]dF (y) =
Z
t(y)dF (y): (7)
Because of (7) we obtain
~t(y) = t+ [t(y)  t]: (8)
The parameter  denes the degree of progressiveness of ~t(:) relative to
t(:).  > 1 implies that all the individuals contributing below average will
9See Spector (2000) for an argument as to why rational debate takes place on one
dimension only.
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see their contribution diminished while the ones with incomes above will
contribute more. The opposite holds for  < 1. Therefore,  > 1 increases
[and  < 1 decreases] the progressiveness of ~t(:) relative to t(:). Note that
the sign of  has no restrictions. We can as well consider  < 1 so as to
invert the direction of transfers between rich and poor.
We place very weak restrictions on the tax functions. We shall work with
the set  of all functions from < to < that are strictly increasing. The set 
is not conditioned to a particular aggregate net tax revenue, it contains all
the strictly increasing functions.
Consider any arbitrary t() 2  and any given . The valuation of a
change in progressiveness by  will be
u

y   [t+ (t(y)  t)]; [t+ (t(y)  t)] + (1  )t

: (9)
Given a tax function t() we denote by (t(); y) the change that would
be preferred by an individual with income y.
Denition 2 A tax function t() is individually acceptable to a person with
income y if (t(); y) = 1.
We denote by =(y) the set of all tax functions t() 2  that are individ-
ually acceptable to earners of income y.
We assume that the government chooses the tax function that is accept-
able to the largest share possible of the population. We now explore the most
demanding acceptability requirement: consensus.
Denition 3 A tax function t() is consensual, t() 2 =, if it is unanimously
acceptable; that is, if t() 2 T
y
=(y).
We will show in the next section that such a stringent requirement on
income taxation does not yield an empty set.
3.2 Existence of Consensus Income Taxation
In this section, we show that the requirement of a consensus income tax
schedule yields determinate results: for any given distribution of income
there is always one and only one tax function in the set  that satises this
property.
Theorem 4 The set = is non-empty and contains one single element only.
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Proof. Consider any arbitrary t(), t and : The valuation of a  a¢ ne
transformation, as in (9), is
u (y   (t+  (t(y)  t)) ;  (t+  (t(y)  t)) + (1  )t) : (10)
It can be readily veried that the utility valuation is concave in : Hence,
the rst order condition fully characterizes the preferred :
Di¤erentiating with respect to  we obtain
@u
@
= (t(y)  t)  ux  y   ~t(y); (y; ~g)+ ug  y   ~t(y); (y; ~g) :
Note that for all t(:) 2 , (t(y)   t) 6= 0 except for at most one value of y.
Hence, (y; t(y)) is implicitly characterized by the condition
ux (y   [t+  (t(y)  t)] ;  [t+  (t(y)  t)] + (1  )t)
ug (y   [t+  (t(y)  t)] ;  [t+  (t(y)  t)] + (1  )t) = : (11)
If t(y) is universally acceptable, then (y; t(y)) = 1 for all y:
We start with an arbitrary parameter t and with the implicit denition
of t(y) by
ux (y   t(y); t(y) + (1  )t)
ug (y   t(y); t(y) + (1  )t) = : (12)
Because of Assumption 1, the left-hand-side of (12) is strictly increasing
in t(y); it goes to innity as t(y) ! y and to zero as t(y) !  1 

t: Hence,
for each t and y there exists a unique t(y) satisfying (12). We can thus write
t(y) =  (y; t; ): (13)
It can be readily veried that  is continuous and strictly increasing in y
and continuous and strictly decreasing in t.
For an arbitrary t, the average tax collection t is
t =
Z
 (y; t; )dF (y) = (t; ):
The socially acceptable tax-transfer policy t(:) is given by (13) evaluated
at t; where t satises t = (t; ):
We are now required to show that  has a xed point. Since  is con-
tinuous and strictly decreasing in t, so is . From (11) we can easily obtain
that for t = 0,  (y; 0; ) > 0 for all y. Therefore, we have that for t = 0,
(0; ) > 0. Since  is continuous and strictly decreasing in t, there exists a
unique t such that t = (t; ). This completes the proof.
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A clarifying note on the restriction on the tax function: individual accept-
ability as dened earlier only considers changes in the steepness of the tax
function that leave the aggregate tax revenue unchanged. This restriction
may raise concerns of a hidden restriction" on the tax functions truly under
consideration. However, observe that the set =(y) is obtained after having
tested the acceptability of all possible strictly increasing functions with any
arbitrary aggregate tax revenue. Therefore, the set =(y) contains tax func-
tions yielding very di¤erent aggregate tax revenues. The restriction that a
tax function is consensual, and hence acceptable to all, selects not only the
consensual steepness of the tax function, but its net revenue as well. The
aggregate tax revenue  and hence the size of government & is determined
together with the shape of the tax function.
We shall show in Section 7 that for CES preferences one can take the size
of government, &, as chosen by the voters. Then, the consensual tax function
is uniquely chosen together with the bias in government spending. In other
words, given the size of government, there is a unique distribution of the
benets of public spending and of the burden of income taxation such that
all individuals nd it acceptable.
3.3 The Shape of the Income Tax Schedule
In this section, we examine the shape of the consensus income tax schedule.
We start by showing that the marginal tax rate is positive and does not
exceed unity.
Proposition 5 The marginal tax rate of the consensus tax function satises
0  t0(:)  1.
Proof. Totally di¤erentiating (11) with respect to t(:) and y and rear-
ranging we obtain
dt(:)
dy
=
uxgux   uxxug
(uxgux   uxxug) + (uxgug   uggux) :
Observe that the numerator and the rst term in the denominator are iden-
tical and they are positive because of Assumption 1. Because of Assumption
1, again, the second term in the denominator is also positive. Therefore, the
marginal tax rate is positive and less than unity.
Given that we have assumed that individual incomes are exogenous, one
can question what prevents poor individuals from accepting a full income
equalization. Government policy allocates the ublicly supplied commodity
as an increasing function of ones contribution in taxes. If a low-income
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earner demands more progressiveness, and therefore a larger transfer, she
will be trading-o¤ greater private consumption for less public consumption.
Likewise, high-income earners may be willing to sacrice private consumption
in order to obtain higher levels of public consumption. At the consensus tax
schedule, the marginal rate of substitution between the private and publicly
supplied commodities will be equal across the population. It is worth noting
that it is precisely this property that makes consensus tax functions welfare
e¢ cient.
4 Properties of the Consensus Income Taxa-
tion
4.1 E¢ ciency
We have uniquely characterized an income tax function based on the notion
of individual acceptability, combined with a government seeking consensus.
The consensus income tax has interesting e¢ ciency properties: the consensus
income tax maximizes Social Welfare among all the tax functions in  that
yield the same net tax revenue.
We dene the (Utilitarian) Social Welfare as the sum of the individual
utilities, that is,
W (t(:)) =
Z
u(y   t(y); t(y) + (1  )t)dF (y): (14)
We now show that W (t(:))  W (t(:)) for all t(:) 2  with net tax
revenue t.
Proposition 6 Let t(:) be a consensus income tax function with net tax
revenue t. Then, t(:) maximizes the Utilitarian Social Welfare over all tax
functions t(:) 2  with net tax revenue t.
Proof. We can write
W (t(:)) W (t(:)) =
=
Z
[u(y   t(y); t(y) + (1  )t)  u(y   t(y); t(y) + (1  )t)]dF (y):
Since u(:; :) is concave in the tax function, and using (11), we can write
W (t(:)) W (t(:)) 
14
Z
[t(y) t(y)]
h
 ux(y t(y); t(y)+(1 )t)+ug(y t(y); t(y)+(1 )t)
i
dF (y) = 0:
The intuition for this result is as follows. Any local perturbation of a tax
function will simultaneously modify the private and public consumptions of
the individuals in this income interval and will thus vary the marginal rate
of substitution between the two. A necessary condition for a tax function be
welfare maximizing is that the marginal rate of substitution between the two
consumptions has to be equal across the population. But, this precisely is
the condition that characterizes the unique consensus income tax function.
Let us emphasize that a consensus income tax maximizes welfare subject
to a net revenue constraint. The implication is that had we xed an arbi-
trary exogenous net tax revenue (di¤erent from t) we would have found no
consensual tax function yielding this arbitrary revenue.
4.2 Nash Equilibrium Taxation
Consensus income taxation can also be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium of
a voluntary tax-contribution game.
A tax function t() with net tax revenue t is the tax paid by an individual
with income y. Let (y) denote a deviation from the proposed tax payment.
Each individual selects the extent of deviation that suits her best.
A tax function t() is a Nash equilibrium if no individual player deviates
from the proposed voluntary tax payment.
We can now state the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 The consensus income tax t() is a Nash equilibrium of the
tax-contribution game.
Proof. Note rst that no individual deviation can modify the net tax
revenue t. Thus, for an individual with income y the payo¤ of deviating by
(y) is
u

y   (t(y) + (y)); (t(y) + (y)) + (1  )t

:
The rst order condition for a maximum is
ux

y   (t(y) + (y)); (t(y) + (y)) + (1  )t

=
= ug

y   (t(y) + (y)); (t(y) + (y)) + (1  )t

:
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In view of Theorem 1, it is straightforward that if t() = t() the optimal
deviation satises (y) = 0, and that this holds for all y.
This property of consensus income taxation is the analog of the equilib-
rium in the case of voluntary contributions to public goods.
5 Income Taxation and Public Expenditure:
the CES case
In this section, we restrict individual preferences to be of the CES type. This
will permit us to examine the e¤ects of income inequality, of expenditure bias
and of the elasticity of substitution on the tax schedule and on the size of
government.
The family of CES utility functions is given by:
u(x; g) =
h
x
 1
 + g
 1

i 
 1
; (15)
with the elasticity of substitution  > 0:
The marginal utilities to the two types of consumption are
ux = x
  1

h
x
 1
 + g
 1

i 1
 1
; and
ug = g
  1

h
x
 1
 + g
 1

i 1
 1
:
Therefore,
ux (x; g)
ug (x; g)
=

y   t(y)
t(y) + (1  )t
  1

= : (16)
We can thus easily obtain that
t(y) =
y   (1  ) t
1 + 1 
: (17)
Integrating over the incomes y we can obtain
t =
  (1  ) t
1 + 1 
:
Hence,
t =

1 +  
= g: (18)
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Therefore, we obtain that the consensus income tax schedule is linear
t(y) = y   T; (19)
where
  1
1 + 1 
and T  1  
1 + 1 
 
1 +  
: (20)
From (18) we obtain the size of the public sector & to be
& =
g

=
1
1 +  
: (21)
We can now state our results on income taxation and the size of gov-
ernment. First, we discuss the e¤ect of  and  on the marginal tax rate
t0().
Proposition 8 Let preferences be CES. Then: (i) the unique consensus in-
come tax is linear; (ii) it is independent of the distribution of income; (iii)
the (constant) marginal tax rate, t0()   , increases (decreases) with the bias
parameter  if the elasticity of substitution is high (low),  > 1 ( < 1); and
(iv) an increase in the elasticity of substitution reduces the marginal tax rate.
Proof. Statements (i) and (ii) follow immediately from (19).
Di¤erentiating the marginal tax rate in (19) with respect to  we obtain
d
d
= (   1) 
 
(1 + 1 )2
:
This proves statement (iii). As for statement (iv) we di¤erentiate with respect
to  and after simple manipulation we obtain
d
d
= (1  )ln:
Noting that ln < 0, statement (iv) results.
With no assumptions on the tax-transfer function, and with CES prefer-
ences, we obtain that the unique t() to be consensual is a linear tax function.
Therefore, any departure from linearity in taxes requires signicant variations
in the substitutability of the two bundles of commodities as income varies.
By the same argument, inequality in the distribution of pre-tax income
does not play a major role in determining the degree of income redistribution,
 , unless individual preferences display a signicant variation in the degree
of substitution as real income changes.
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The marginal tax rate depends upon the bias of government spending.
The e¤ect of a more egalitarian expenditure policy,  ! 0, on the marginal
tax rate  critically depends upon the degree of substitutability between the
two bundles of goods. For low substitutability,  < 1, the marginal tax rate
tends to unity and for high substitutability,  > 1, it tends to zero.
Finally, in economies with a moderate share of government an increase
in the substitutability between the two bundles of goods will decrease the
marginal tax rate,  .
Let us now turn to the e¤ects of  and  on the size of government & = g

.
From (21) we can easily obtain the following result.
Proposition 9 Let preferences be CES. Then, the size of government &: (i)
increases with the bias parameter ; and (ii) decreases with the elasticity of
substitution .
The results of Proposition 9 are not surprising. The rst result implies
that the higher the pro-rich bias in the public spending, the larger will be
the size of the government that the population will consider acceptable. The
second result implies that increasing the substitutability between the market
and the publicly supplied goods will induce a demand for a smaller size of
the government.10
It is worth discussing the case of the tax schedule being linear. Consider
the e¤ect of an increase by  of an income y. Due to the biased expenditure
policy, a linear income tax implies that private and public consumption will
also increase at the same rate. If preferences have a falling elasticity of
substitution of private for public consumption, individuals with an income
increased by  would prefer a more than proportional increase in the supply
of the public good and hence would rather favor an increasing marginal tax
rate. If the elasticity of substitution were to rise individuals would have
a preference for declining marginal tax rates. Clearly, whether individuals
unanimously support a tax function with increasing or decreasing marginal
tax rates critically depends upon the change in the elasticity of substitution
10This result seems in contradiction with Karrass (1994) argument that the larger is the
public sector the more the goods and services supplied will be substitutes for the goods
provided through the market. Two points are in order. First, Karras does not take into
account that the substitutability between public and private goods critically depends on
the political decision of allowing or not the private supply of substitutes (e.g. security,
mail service, prisons,...). Second, Karrass argument does not consider whether such an
increase in the size of government would be considered acceptable. This precisely is our
point: if the government allows for higher substitutability the policy that will be found
consensual will consist of a smaller size of the government sector.
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as the consumption levels rise. A similar argument holds for why the tax
rate is shown to be independent of the distribution of income.
In our model, the supply of a subset of commodities is the monopoly of
the government. This monopoly provides the government with the coercive
power to make individuals accept taxation on incomes. How e¤ective this
power is critically depends upon the substitutability between this bundle of
commodities and the commodities individuals can purchase in the market.
Hence, our approach suggests that the rich will lobby more strongly for in-
creasing the substitutability between public and private goods by privatizing
as many as possible rather than about the shape of the income tax schedule.
6 Voting over Public Expenditure: the CES
case
We have already argued that political scientists have underscored that polit-
ical confrontation takes place more in the domain of public expenditure than
in the setting of income taxation. In the previous section we have character-
ized the consensus tax function  and the corresponding net tax revenue
as a function of the expenditure policy parameter . We shall now examine
the choice over expenditure policies, ^ by majority voting. On this respect
we shall simply transpose the analysis of majority voting on income taxation
by Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) and apply
it to the individual preferences over expenditure policy  and show that a
majority voting equilibrium exists. In our case too, the most preferred expen-
diture policy is monotonic in the individual income and hence the policy that
obtains a majoritarian support is the one preferred by the individual with the
median income, m. Furthermore, we also obtain that higher inequality  the
relative gap between mean and median income brings a more distributive
public spending, i.e. lower .
Proposition 10 The majoritarian expenditure policy ^ is the one most pre-
ferred by the median income voter and is implicitly determined by the unique
solution to
(1  ^)(1 + ^ 1)
(1 + ^)2
=
 m

;
where m is the median income, that is, F (m) = 1=2. Moreover, ^ is strictly
decreasing in  m

M , a measure of income inequality.
Proof. Di¤erentiating with respect to  the utility of an individual with
income y we have that
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du(x(y); g(y))
d
= ux
dx(y)
d
+ ug
dg(y)
d
:
Since the tax is consensual we can use (11) to obtain
du(x(y); g(y))
d
= ug
h

dx(y)
d
+
dg(y)
d
i
:
We know that
dx(y)
d
=  dt(y)
d
;
and that
dg(y)
d
= t(y)  
1 +  
+ 
dt(y)
d
+ 
(1  ) (1+)
(1 +  )2
:
Therefore,
du(x(y); g(y))
d
= ug
h
t(y)  
1 +  
+ 
(1  ) (1+)
(1 +  )2
i
:
Rearranging we nally obtain that the rst order condition for a maxi-
mum is
du(x(y); g(y))
d
=
ug
1 + 1 
h(1  )(1 +  1)
(1 + )2
    y

i
= 0: (22)
The sign of du(x(y);g(y))
d
depends on the term in square brackets. The rst
fraction within the brackets is positive. Hence, for y   the derivative is
always positive and these individuals prefer  = 1.
For y < , the sign depends on the rst fraction within the brackets, that
we denote by  (). That is,
 ()  (1  )(1 + 
 1)
(1 + )2
: (23)
It is immediate that  (1) = 0. When  ! 0 we can easily obtain that
lim!0  () ! 1 if  > 1 and lim!0  () ! 1 if  < 1. Therefore, for
y < , it follows that
lim
!1
du(x(y); g(y))
d
< 0; and lim
!0
du(x(y); g(y))
d
> 0:
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Hence, for all individuals with y <  there exists a utility maximizing ,
 2 (0; 1).
We shall now show that for y <  there is a unique y satisfying (22). To
this e¤ect we shall show that if (22) is satised for some y, then d 
d

y
< 0.
For notational simplicity we shall drop the superscript y.
Since  y

< 1 we have from FOC (22) that
 ()  (1  )(1 + 
 1)
(1 + )2
< 1: (24)
Di¤erentiating   with respect to , using (23) and rearranging we have
 0() =   ()
h 1
1   +
2 1
1 + 
  (   1)
 2
1 +  1
i
.
Rearranging terms we have
 0() =   ()
h 1 +  2
(1 + )2
+ 
2 1 + 2 2    2
(1 + )(1 +  1)
i
:
Using (23) we have
 0() =   ()
h 1
 ()
1 +  2
(1  )(1 +  1) +
2 1 + 2 2    2
(1 + )(1 +  1)
i
:
Because of (24) we can nally write
 0() <   ()
h 1 +  2
(1  )(1 +  1) +
2 1 + 2 2    2
(1 + )(1 +  1)
i
=
=    ()
(1  )(1 +  1)(1 + )
h
1 + (1  ) 1 + 2 2
i
< 0:
This proves that there is a unique utility maximizing (y) and that indi-
vidual preferences over  are single peacked.
Since the unique preferred  for each income y, (y), is strictly decreasing
in y, the expenditure policy that will earn a majoritarian support, ^, is the
one preferred by the median voter [with the median income, m], ^ = (m).
Concerning the relationship between ^ andM(  m

), it directly follows
from the fact that   is strictly decreasing in .
21
Note that the choice over  is equivalent to choosing a¢ ne transformations
of the expenditure function. While consensus over tax functions was possible,
there is no consensus possible when it comes to expenditure policy and the
choice has to be made via majority voting. Paralleling the results in the
literature on voting over linear tax functions mentioned before, we also obtain
that the median voter will be pivotal for a majority and hence will impose
its most preferred policy. Furthermore, as inequality increases the chosen
expenditure policy becomes more redistributive  lower ^.
However, taking into account our results of the previous section, higher
inequality does not necessarily bring steeper tax schedules. It depends on the
substitutability between the market and publicly supplied goods. Specically,
higher inequality and higher progressivity of the public spending will be
associated with lower marginal tax rates if the substitutability is high. This
implies that more unequal countries in which the government has allowed
for high substitutability between public and private will have lower marginal
tax rates than more egalitarian countries with low substitutability between
the two. To our knowledge this sheds new light on the puzzle posed by the
empirical observation that income inequality appears to be a poor predictor of
the level of income taxation. In the next section, we shall test the implication
of the model that the sign of the relationship between inequality and the
marginal tax rate depends on the substitutability parameter, .
7 Voting over the Size of Government: the
CES case
We have mentioned before that in some countries the size of government,
more than the distribution of the benets of public expenditure, is the issue
that truly is at the core of the political debate. We shall now show that for
the CES case our previous analysis can be equivalently be rewritten with the
size of government being the key variable over which the population votes.
Let us start by consensus taxation. Now the question is: given a size of
government, &, is there a consistent tax function t() and a bias in spending
 such that there is consensus over the tax function?
Notice rst that, when checking for the acceptability of a tax function, the
a¢ ne transformation considered had to yield the same net revenue. Then, a
tax function was consensual if no one would prefer to change its steepness.
To check whether such tax function exists we used the rst order condition
and obtained the net revenue  the size of government that satises the
budget constraint. What we do now is to keep the size of government x &
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 hence, t x and, using the rst order condition, verify whether there is
a  for which the government budget balances.
In (17) we derived that the rst order condition requires that
t(y) =
y   (1  ) t
1 + 1 
:
Integrating over the incomes we obtain the net revenue that depends on
,
t() =
  (1  ) t
1 + 1 
:
The point now is whether there exists o such that t(o) = t, and by
budget balance t(o) = g. It is immediate that, for all & = t=  1=2, such
o 2 [0; 1] exists, it is unique, and it is given by
o =
 &
1  &
 1

: (25)
The corresponding consensus marginal tax rate is
 =
1
1 +

&
1 &
 1 

: (26)
From these two expressions it directly follows that: (i) the bias in spending
is strictly increasing with government size; and (ii) the marginal tax rate
decreases or increases with government size as the elasticity of substitution
is smaller or larger than 1.
Finally, observe that since & is strictly increasing in , we can exactly
rephrase our results on voting obtained in the previous Section: the majori-
tarian size of government is the one preferred by the median voter. It is also
immediate that the size of government chosen by majority voting is strictly
decreasing with inequality, M .
8 Empirical Exercise
8.1 Testable Implications
For the case of constant-elasticity preferences, our model has well-dened,
testable implications. Specically, we shall focus on the following two funda-
mental implications:
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1. Majority voting leads to a choice of bias in public expenditure  that
is negatively related to the median to income relative gap, M . Alter-
natively, & is negatively related to the median to income relative gap,
M .
2. There is a positive relationship between the marginal tax rate  and
M when the substitutability  is low, and a negative relationship when
the substitutability is high.
We nd all these implications to be validated by our empirical analyses.
We test for the robustness of the results using two proxies for , health and
edn, and two proxies for , health and edn. We also use the Gini index,
G, as a proxy for the mean to median relative gap, M . These proxies are
discussed in the next subsection.
8.2 Empirical Strategy and Data
We shall now test the empirical validity of the relationships described above.
We do not have direct data on any of these three independent variables and
hence we have had to work with reasonable proxies. Furthermore, our choice
of proxies has been severely conditioned by the need of a consistent set of
basic information available for a su¢ ciently large number of countries. We
have therefore tested our empirical implications using the OECD database11
that includes fteen countries, listed in the Appendix.
We rst discuss our proxy for  . This is the slope of the a¢ ne tax function
that is acceptable by all with CES preferences. In our paper the tax function
merges the income tax schedule and the several money transfers. In other
words, t() is the di¤erence between factor income (plus retirement payments
and minus retirement contributions) and disposable income.
In purity, we would have had to test whether the di¤erence between the
two individual incomes can be represented by an a¢ ne function. The only
data base available with such individual information is the Luxembourg In-
come Study database. We performed this exercise but discarded the esti-
mates for two reasons. First, the estimated parameters were unreasonably
unstable from year to year, suggesting some possible deciencies in the raw
data. Second,  and  would have to be estimated from completely di¤erent
sources.
We have therefore used the maximum marginal tax rate in each country
reported in the OECD database as a proxy for  . This implicitly assumes
that there is a stable relationship between the maximum marginal tax rate
11We use the OECD Statistical database obtainable at www.oecd.org/statistics.
24
and the slope of the a¢ ne function that would approximate the di¤erence
between factor and disposable individual incomes.
Let us now turn to our estimates for . As dened in Section 2,  captures
the pro-rich distributional bias in the public provision of goods and services,
which we denote by G. This bias depends upon the share in the govern-
ment budget of the expenditures that mostly benet the low incomes versus
those that benet the rich taxpayers. For some countries, discussed earlier,
there are estimates of the distribution of the benets of specic lines of gov-
ernment expenditure (essentially, education and health).12 We are however
interested in the distribution of the benets of the entire government supply
of goods and services (including general administration and law-and-order,
among others). Therefore, we have had to estimate our own proxies for .
We rst compute G, the total government expenditure in the provision of
goods and services, from OECD data sources. G is obtained by subtracting
the expenditures on money transfers from the total amount of government
expenditure, as detailed in Appendix B. All estimates are in constant 2000
US dollars. The size of government is then computed as
& i =
Gi
GDPi
:
As for estimating a proxy for , we focus on two redistributive, pro-poor
public expenditures: health and education, Ghealth and Gedn. Bearing in
mind that  is the pro-rich bias, we estimate two proxies:
i = 1 
Gi
G
; (27)
where i = health, education.
We also require an estimate for the elasticity of substitution between the
two bundles of commodities, private and publicly provided, . The sub-
stitutability between public and private expenditure has been a recurrent
topic in macroeconomics. Since the work of Barro (1981), there have been
12There is a large literature which discusses and identies the redistributiveness of pub-
lic expenditures.(See Le Grand, 1982 for the redistributive e¤ects of health and education
in the UK - he concludes that of the two education is more redistributive). A large debate
in the 1980s (Hansen and Weisman 1969, Pechman 1970) contest the redistributive e¤ects
of higher education in particular, concluding that the redistributive e¤ects of higher edu-
cation were debatable, and that existing measurement methodologies were not successful
in e¤ectively measuring their e¤ects. We do not perform any statistical analyses to test for
the relative redistributiveness of the di¤erent types of public expenditures in the OECD
countries studied; this would entail a separate econometric exercise beyond the purview
of this paper.
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numerous attempts at estimating the elasticity of substitution. Aschauer
(1985) nds a signicant degree of substitutability between the two variables
for the United States. Karras (1994) nds that they are complementary or
unrelated, using data for 30 countries. Evans and Karras (1996) provide
additional evidence supporting the complementarity using data for 54 coun-
tries. More recently, Amano and Wirjanto (1998) for the US show that the
two variables are unrelated or have very weak complementarity. For Japan,
Hamori and Asako (1999) nd a signicant degree of substitutability, while
for Okubo (2003) the two bundles are complementary or unrelated. Finally,
Bouakez and Rebei (2006) with the same specication of preferences as ours
- but with habit formation - estimate  = 0:332.
Unfortunately, we are unable to use these [quite contradictory] estimates
for the following reasons. First, in most of the macroeconomics literature
substitutability is dened by the sign of the cross derivative and by the cor-
responding elasticity, . Second, the models are all inter-temporal and this
aspect proves to be critical for the estimates. Ni (1995) empirically nds that
when the two expenditures add linearly in the preferences, the estimates indi-
cate substitutability, while if the two expenditures enter the utility function
non-separably one obtains complementarity. Third, the estimates are per-
plexingly contradictory. Finally, much of the literature estimates a world
elasticity using panel data, whereas we require country estimates, to obtain
a ranking across countries. Kwan (2006), for example, using co-integration
methods, has found that for nine East Asia countries while the two bundles
are substitutes on the average, they are complements in others. In sum, we
cannot base our empirical work on these estimates.
Our approach to the estimation of  is therefore as follows. The substi-
tutability between the two bundles of commodities depends upon the nature
of individual preferences and on the degree of monopoly that the government
keeps for itself for some subset of commodities, as discussed earlier. For many
OECD countries the postal system or security has been a public monopoly
until fairly recently. Today, however, the rich can supplement the public
supply of police force, for instance, by purchasing additional private security.
Similarly, in many countries education and health have high degrees of pub-
licness" while in others, a good share of the demand is satised through the
private market. The larger the share of the expenditure channelled through
the market, the higher is the substitutability between the public and the pri-
vate provision of these goods. For our purposes, therefore, we use a metric ,
which equals the ratio of private over the total of public and private expendi-
tures in health and in education, as a proxy for the elasticity of substitution
.
Using this ratio, we proxy the elasticity of substitution by making  =
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=(1   ): If all is private, and  = 1; then the elasticity is innity. We
compute  for education and for health using comparative data of public
and private expenses available at the OECD.13 Using the two s, we obtain
edn and health:
Indeed, these are very rough proxies for the true" elasticities of sub-
stitution. Our empirical exercise, however, rests on the ranking" of the
countries by their degree of substitutability and not on the absolute value of
the elasticity of substitution.
Since both education and health expenditures have similar pro-poor inci-
dence, we could have used data on education only for our proxies for  and
. However, there is a criticism often discussed in the literature against the
use of education: i.e. that of potential reverse causality. Indeed, education
is directly benecial to the poor, but it also enhances their earning poten-
tial in future. Consequently, countries with a large share of expenditure in
education will exhibit lower levels of inequality. To account for this possible
endogeneity, we complement our analysis with expenditures on health. While
not as strongly redistributive as primary education,14 the eventual e¤ect of
health expenditures on the earning potential of the poor  and therefore on
inequality is of a smaller order of magnitude.
Finally, we also compute the relative mean-median gap, M = ( m)=.
Unfortunately, complete data is not available for all years. We therefore
supplement our analysis by using G as a proxy for M in our empirical esti-
mations. For this, we use the country Gini estimates15
13Estimates of  are available at http://darp.lse.ac.uk/expenditures/. The data source
for our estimates is the OECD Social Expenditure database. Data has been available
only for di¤erent spreads of years - the earliest being 1980 till 2008. The spread of years
has varied from country to country, with the least spread being 1997 to 2007, and the
maximum spread being 1980 to 2008.
14Accordingly with the estimates for the UK reported in the Table below, the benets
from education are more tilted towards the poor than the benets from the National
Health Service.
UK: All households, 2004-2005
Quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Income and benets per household in pounds
Pre-tax income 4:280 11:200 21:580 34:460 66:330
Benets in kind
- education 2:585 2:015 2:083 1:608 1:221
- health 3:629 3:577 3:204 2:754 2:446
Source: Jones (2006)
15The database used is V2.0c at http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/.
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M G
health -2.74
 -.476
edn -0.02 .034
Notes: : Signicant at the 1% level
y: Signicant at the 5% level
z: Signicant at the 10% level
Table 1: OLS Regression M and G on 
8.3 Relationship between  and M
In Section 6 we derive that the relationship between the distributional bias of
public expenditure  and M resulting from majority voting is negative. We
now estimate the relationship between these two entities. We rst estimate
OLS regressions of the relationship given by
it = 0 + 1Mit + it (28)
where Mit is the value of M in country i in time t and it is the distri-
butional bias in public expenditure for country i in time t. The results are
presented in Table 1 below.
We observe that the relationship is negative and signicant for health. We
also observe that the relationship is not signicant when using edn: This is,
however, not very surprising. We have already discussed that the expenditure
in education may have some serious endogeneity problems. We obtain similar
results when we use the Gini index G instead of M .
For robustness, we estimate kernel regressions to observe the nature of
the relationship between  and M .16 The model estimated is given by
it = g(Mit) + it; (29)
where, as before, it is the distributional bias in public expenditure for coun-
try i in time t, Mit is the value of M for country i in time t, g(:) is a generic
function and it is an error term. The estimated kernel regression is displayed
in Figure 1
16We use the Epanechnikov kernel estimator (Silverman 1986) for the kernel regressions,
which is standard in the literature.
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Kernel regression, bw = .15, k = 3
Grid points
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Figure 1: Kernel regression of health:on M
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The OLS results above are supported by the kernel regressions in Figure
1 which clearly shows the relationship to be monotonically decreasing for
health.
To summarize, Section 6 establishes that there is a negative relationship
between  andM: Our empirical exercise validates this result with both OLS
and kernel regressions.
8.4 Relationship between & and M
In this section we investigate the relationship between the size of govern-
ment, & it and Mit: Section 7 establishes the relationship between & and M
to be negative. We use the same dataset used in the previous sub-section to
estimate this relationship. There are 325 observations for the same countries
that we have used in the previous analysis.
We estimate the model below using OLS:
& it =  0 +  1Mit + it; (30)
where & it is the ratio of government expenditure to GDP for country i
in time t, Mit is the (mean  median)=mean of country i in time t, it is a
random error term. The estimates of the OLS model are presented in Table
2.
coefficients
 1 -.484

cons .461
Notes: : Signicant at the 1% level
y: Signicant at the 5% level
z: Signicant at the 10% level
Table 2: OLS Regression of size of government on M
We obtain a signicant negative relationship between & and M; as estab-
lished in Section 7.
For robustness, we estimate a kernel regression, to observe the nature of
the relationship between & and M without imposing a functional specica-
tion. We estimate the model:
& it = H(Mit) + it: (31)
30
Kernel regression, bw = .05, k = 3
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Figure 2: Kernel regression of & on M
where, & it is the size of the government for country i in time t, Mit is the
value of M for country i in time t, H(:) is a generic function and it is an
error term.
The estimated kernel regression is displayed in Figure 2
The kernel regression clearly shows a strong negative relationship between
size of government and inequality as measured by M .
8.5 Relationship between  and M
In this section we investigate the relationship between  and M; conditional
on the value of ; the elasticity of substitution. We use both health and edn
as measures of the elasticity of substitution. Our model implies (Section
5) that for low values of ; there exists a positive relationship between the
marginal tax rate andM , while for higher values of , this relationship turns
negative.
We use threshold regressions to estimate the relationship between  and
M . Threshold regressions estimate the threshold value , , for which there
exist two di¤erent regimes of the relationship between  and M , above and
below the threshold value .
We estimate the following model:
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 it = 0 + 1Mit1(it  ) + 2Mit1(it > ) + it; (32)
where  it is the dependent variable (the marginal tax rate corresponding to
country i in time t), Mit is the value of M for country i in time t, it is the
elasticity of substitution for country i in time t, and the threshold variable,
assumed to be strictly exogenous,  is the threshold parameter. Also, 1
and 2 are the slope parameters for each of the two regimes, and it is a
random disturbance term. The function 1(it  ) is an indicator variable
that takes the value 1 if it  and 0 otherwise. The threshold value of it
is the estimate at which the likelihood function achieves a local minimum.17.
In Table 3 we present the threshold regression estimates for the model
above, using the computed values ofM 18; and health and edn as the thresh-
old variables. For the regressions with health as the threshold variable, we
observe that for values of health  0:63, there is a signicant positive re-
lationship, and for values greater there is a signicant negative relationship
between  andM: Likewise, for edn  0:83, we observe a signicant positive
relationship and for greater values, a negative relationship (not signicant
for our sample). The likelihood function for the threshold regression with
health as the threshold variable is presented in Figure ??.
Regimes health  N edn  N
Regime 1 health  0.63 2.26 280 edn  0.83 1.86y 320
Regime 2 health > 0.63 -0.23 86 edn > 0.83 -0.04 46
Notes: : Signicant at the 1% level
y: Signicant at the 5% level
z: Signicant at the 10% level
Table 3: Threshold Regression of  on M for health and edn as threshold
variables
From the threshold regressions we obtain a robust relationship between
the marginal tax rate  and M with the elasticity of substitution based
17There is no asymptotic theory to obtain p-values corresponding to the
the threshold value obtained, thus our reported threshold values of  de-
pends on the value obtained by minimising the likelihood function. Estima-
tions were performed using Bruce Hansens Gauss programmes obtained from
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~bhansen/progs/progs_threshold.html
18We compute the country specic measures of M using data on the mean and median
values of household income available in the WIDER dataset.
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Figure 3: Likelihood function of the threshold regression with substitutability
of health, achieving a minimum at value 0.63
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on health expenditures: for low values of health  0:63 the relationship is
positive and signicant, and is negative and equally signicant for high values
of elasticity of substitution.
When using the Gini measure as a proxy for M; we obtain the following
results.
Regimes health  N edn  N
Regime 1 health  0.92 -1.465 332 edn  0.18 0.431z 190
Regime 2 health > 0.92 -0.277 34 edn > 0.18 -1.1 176
Notes : Signicant at the 1% level
y: Signicant at the 5% level
z: Signicant at the 10% level
Table 4: Threshold Regression of  on G for health and edn as threshold
variables
Note that the results are more robust using the elasticity of substitution
based on education expenditures. We would like to mention here that in
an earlier version of the paper based on the previous OECD data set the
results were strongly signicant for the regimes above and below the threshold
values. We have however opted to use the latest data made available by the
OECD.
Combining the results in Section 6 on voting over the expenditure policy
with the results in Section 3 on consensus taxation, we have derived that
the relationship between income taxation and inequality is conditioned by
the substitutability parameter . Indeed, we have obtained that for low
levels of substitutability more inequality leads to a higher tax rate, while
for higher substitutability the relationship is the opposite. Our empirical
exercise validates this result.
It is worth noting that our results therefore provide an explanation for
why direct linear regressions between taxation and inequality have obtained
such poor results.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we have jointly treated public taxation and spending. This
joint treatment has allowed us to address that the two policies cannot be
chosen independent of each other. Based on recent empirical evidence, that
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partisan confrontation is much stronger on expenditure policies rather than
on income taxation, we examine the case in which expenditure policy is
chosen by majority voting and income taxation is consistently adjusted. This
model allows us to address novel issues such as the interdependence between
income taxation, the composition of public spending and the substitutability
between public and private goods.
The main results are that inequality is negatively related to the pro-rich
bias in public expenditure and to the size of government, and that inequality
is positively or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending
upon the elasticity of substitution between public and private goods being
be low of high. Both implications are validated by our empirical exercise
using kernel regressions and threshold regressions, respectively.
The paper has substantial room for improvement on both counts: theoret-
ical and empirical. While redistributive activity of the government through
taxes and transfers has attracted the interest of researchers, the role of public
spending has been comparatively neglected. We know too little about the
redistributive impact of the di¤erent components of the government budget
G.19 Even for countries where redistributive e¤ects are regularly estimated,
such as the UK, they focus on ve budget lines only: education, health,
housing subsidies, travel subsidies, and school meals. But the impact of the
rest of budget lines remain unexplored. For most countries such estimates
simply do not exist. This lack of information is paralleled by a similar lack of
modelling on how the change in the structure of government spending a¤ects
the consumer behavior and well-being.
The analysis of the substitutability between the private and publicly pro-
vided goods and services deserves further attention. We are aware of no
empirical work estimating this degree of substitutability nor of any formal
modeling of the e¤ect of the regulation of the private substitutive supply of
goods and services that are also being provided by the state.
There is much to be gained by the joint analysis of public taxation and
expenditure. Our work is but a rst step in this direction.
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A Countries used in the study - OECD data-
base
The countries which are used for our analysis are as follows. Data has been
obtained from the OECD database, at www.oecd.org/statistics
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
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Portugal
Slovak Republic
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
The range of years for which the data is used varies from 1980s to 2005,
the bulk of it being in the 1990s and 2000s, depending upon the availability
of the data. We have no missing observations.
B Denition of social transfers, OECD
Government expenditures net of transfers (G) were obtained by the following
sums =
Total expenditures of General government (national currency, current
prices, code: TLYCG:)  
(Subsidies (D3CG) +
Social transfers other than social transfers in-kind (D62CG) +
Other current transfers (D7CG) +
Capital transfers (D9CG))
The data was obtained from OECD Government expenditure by function.
All estimates are constant 2000 dollars.
The share of education expenditures on G was calculated as ratio of pub-
lic expenditures to pre-primary and primary education (all types of transac-
tions, all educational programmes) on G. education is obtained as 1  share
of education expenditures in G. This data was obtained from UNESCO-
OECD-Eurostat (UOE) data on education statistics, compiled on the basis
of national administrative sources, reported by Ministries of Education or
National Statistical O¢ ces.
The share of health expenditures inG was calculated as the ratio of public
expenditures to health to G. health was obtained as 1  (share of education
expenditures in G). The data was obtained from OECD System of Health
Accounts.
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